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Legalese versus plain 
language
by Peter Butt
L egal English has traditionally been a special variety of English. Mysterious in form and expression, it is larded with law-Latin and Norman-French, 
heavily dependent on the past, and unashamedly archaic. 
Antiquated words flourish  words such as herein, therein, 
whereas — words long lost to everyday language. A spurious 
sense of precision is conjured through liberal use of jargon 
and stilted formalism: the said, aforesaid, the same, such (used 
as an adjective). Oddities abound: for example, oath 
swearers do not believe something, they verily believe it; 
parties do not wish something, they are desirous of it; the 
clearest photocopy only purports to be a copy; and so on. 
All this   and much more   from a profession which 
regards itself as learned.
In recent years, however, we have seen a growing 
challenge to traditional legal English. Some in the 
solicitors' branch of the legal profession have moved to a 
more relaxed style of writing; some of their precedents 
and opinions are now drafted in a style that is less formal 
and self-important. Change at the bar has been less 
noticeable. Barristers' opinions generally retain the older, 
more formal style; so do pleadings, except where forced to 
confront modernity by external pressures such as the 
Woolf reforms.
I will argue in this article that both branches of the 
profession should move to a more modern, relaxed style   
to 'plain legal language'   and that they can do so without 
loss of legal precision.
We should start with some terminology: what is 'plain 
language'? Definitions vary, but for me it is language that 
communicates directly with the audience for which it is 
written. It allows the reader to understand on a first 
reading. It is organised in a way that meets the reader's 
needs, not the writer's needs. It avoids circumlocution 
and omits surplus words. In short, it uses modern, 
standard English   English of the kind found every day in 
the better newspapers and journals.
TRADITIONAL LEGAL DRAFTING *~
Why change the way that lawyers have drafted for 
centuries? Where are the pressures coming from to alter 
the traditional style of legal writing?J o o
Eest anyone doubt the need to improve the traditional 
style of legal writing, let me cite several examples. The 
first is a 'repairing covenant' from a lease that ended up in 
court on a point of construction (see Ravenseft Properties Ltd 
vDavstone (Holdings) Ltd [1979] 1 All ER 929):
'[The tenant shall] when where and so often as occasion 
requires well and sufficiently ... repair renew rebuild uphold 
support sustain maintain pave purge scour cleanse glaze empty 
amend and keep the premises and every part thereof... and all 
Jloors walls columns roofs canopies lifts and escalators ... shajts 
stairways Jences pavementsJorecourts drains sewers ductsJlues 
conduits wires cables gutters soil and other pipes tanks cisterns 
pumps and other water and sanitary apparatus thereon with all 
needful and necessary amendments whatsoever ...'.
Lord Hoffmann once described this style of lease- 
drafting as 'torrential' (see Norwich Union Life Insurance 
Society v British Railways Board [1987] 2 EGLR 137 at 138). 
It is a style that exudes verbosity, a verbosity which makes 
the document far more difficult to read than its subject 
matter requires. And in the particular case, the verbosity 
  doubtless prompted by a desire to be precise   did not 
in the end prevent litigation over meaning. This exposes 
one of the great misconceptions of traditional legal 
drafting   that somehow it is more precise than modern, 
plain language.
Of course, leases are by no means the worst examples 
we could cite. Mortgages are just as bad. Here is a clause 
from a current Australian mortgage:
'[The Mortgagor shall pay] Also interest upon all such moneys 
as aforesaid or on so much thereof as shall Jbr the time being be 
owing or payable or remain unpaid without (unless the Bank 
otherwise in writing agrees) allowing credit Jor any credit balance 
in any account or accounts of the Mortgagor and the Debtor or 
either of them either alone or jointly with any other person with 
the Bank at the rate or respective rates agreed upon in writing if 
any and in the absence of any such agreement then without prior 
or other notice to the Mortgagor or to the Debtor at such rate or 
rates as the Bank from time to time determines: except as 
otherwise provided by the terms of any agreement in writing 
relating to the whole or part of such moneys such interest shall 
accrue Jrom day to day and shall be computed Jrom the day or
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respective days of such moneys being paid or disbursed or 
becoming owing and at the end of every period of such duration 
as the Bank mayjirom time to time determine and ending at the 
end of such day as the Bank may from time to time determine 
(with power in the Bank to vary from time to time the length of 
such period or the day or days on which such period ends), or, in 
the absence of any such effective determination, at the end of 
each period of one calendar month ending at the end of the last 
day thereof the interest accrued up to and including such day 
upon any such moneys in respect of such period or any part 
thereof shall (if or to the extent to which it has not already been 
paid) commence and thereafter so long as the whole or any part 
thereof shall remain unpaid shall continue to carry interest at the 
rate aforesaid and such accrued but unpaid interest may at the 
option of the Bank be debited against the Debtor or in the case 
of interest upon moneys lent paid or advanced to for or on 
account of the Mortgagor or to for or on account of any other 
person as aforesaid at the request of the Mortgagor orjbr the 
payment of which the Mortgagor is liable to the Bank as 
hereinbefore stated then against the Mortgagor PROVIDED 
ALWAYS that such unpaid interest upon which interest shall 
become so payable shall not be deemed thereby or by reason of 
any such debiting as aforesaid or by the inclusion oj interest with 
principal in any balance carried forward or account stated or 
otherwise than as hereinbefore provided to have become 
capitalised or added to principal but the Bank by express entry to 
that effect in its books and without the necessity of giving notice 
to the Debtor or the Mortgagor may at any time and from time 
to time and as from such date as the Bank shall determine 
capitalise and add to the principal all or any such unpaid 
interest upon which interest shall have become so payable and 
whether such unpaid interest shall have been debited as aforesaid 
or not and such debitings of interest and additions to principal 
may be continued and made and the provisions herein contained 
as to the moneys on which interest is payable shall continue to 
be applicable so long as any of such moneys remain unpaid 
notwithstanding that as between the Bank and the Debtor or as 
between the Bank and the Mortgagor or such other person as 
aforesaid the relationship of banker and customer may have 
ceased and notwithstanding the death or bankruptcy of the 
Mortgagor or of such other person as aforesaid and 
notwithstanding any composition or compromise entered into or 
assented to by the Bank with or in respect of the Debtor or the 
Mortgagor or such other person as aforesaid and notwithstanding 
any judgment obtained against the Debtor or the Mortgagor or 
such other person as aforesaid and notwithstanding any other 
matter or thing whatsoever; in interpreting the foregoing 
provisions money shall be deemed to remain unpaid 
notwithstanding any compromise compounding or release made 
or assented to by the Bank with or in respect of the Debtor or the 
Mortgagor or such other person as aforesaid until the Bank shall 
have received thejull amount to which it would have been 
entitled if it had not entered into such compromise compounding 
or release PROVIDED that the amount of moneys deemed to 
have remained unpaid shall not include such sums as the Bank 
shall have received in respect thereof'. [763 words; 2
commas, 1 semi-colon; 3 sets of brackets; no other 
punctuation]
To some lawyers, drafting feats like these may evoke 
admiration: after all, who among us can replicate such 
linguistic leviathans? But for most readers they evoke only 
bewilderment. Sometimes they bewilder even those who 
proffer them. In a 1992 Australian case, a bank's standard 
form of guarantee was so tortuously drafted that the bank 
manager, when challenged in the witness box, had to 
admit that he could not understand it; nor, when 
challenged by the judge, neither could the bank's counsel 
(Houlahan v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd 
(1992) 110FLR259). Examples like these aptly illustrate 
Professor Rodell's aphorism: 'There are two things wrong 
with almost all legal writing. One is its style. The other is 
its content. That, I think, about covers the ground'. 
('Goodbye to Law Reviews' ((1936) 23 Virginia Law Rev 
38.)
And as we know, the style is not peculiar to private legal 
documents. It pervades statutes as well. Who can forget 
Lord Justice Harman's cry from the heart, in Davy v Leeds 
Corporation [1964] 3 All ER 390 at 394, while struggling 
to glean meaning from the Housing Act 1957:
'To reach a conclusion on this matter involved the court in 
wading through a monstrous legislative morass, staggering from 
stone to stone and ignoring the marsh gas exhaling from the 
forest of schedules lining the way on each side. I regarded it at 
one time, I must confess, as a Slough oj Despond through which 
the court would never drag its feet, but I have by leaping from 
tussock to tussock as best I might, eventually, pale and 
exhausted, reached the other side'.
WHY THE RELUCTANCE TO CHANGE?
Why do lawyers insist on writing in their turgid, 
complex, traditional style? Cynics argue that it is to 
preserve mystique and justify incomes. I doubt that this 
is the reason. Lawyers rarely draft with this purpose in 
mind, even subconsciously. Rather, the explanation lies in 
the ethos in which lawyers find themselves. Three chief 
factors come to mind: inertia, perceived necessity, and 
insecurity.
Inertia
The first factor is inertia. Lawyers uncritically adopt the 
style that lawyers have always adopted. This style is 
inculcated in law schools (see Miner, 'Confronting the
v ' o
Communication Crisis in the Legal Profession' (1989) 34 
NY Law School Law Rev 1). It is a sad fact, but true, that 
most law schools in this country make no systematic 
attempt to teach students the principles of simple, direct 
writing. Indeed, the reverse is often the case: students areo '
encouraged to adopt a style that is formal and academic. 
This style might be thought appropriate for law review 
articles, but it is hardly effective to communicate 29
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information to non-lawyers   who, after all, are the 
consumers of much of what lawyers write. That same style 
is then reinforced in legal practice. It is also mirrored in 
judicial writing   a circumstance doubly unfortunate, 
given that judicial writing is a role model for law students. 
(See further, Stark, 'Why judges have Nothing to Tell
x ' 7 J J o o
Lawyers about Writing' (1990) 1 Scribes' Journal of Legal 
Writing 5; Kirby, 'Is Law Poorly Written? A View from the 
Bench' [1995] New South Wales Law Society Journal (March) 
56.)
Necessity
The second factor is necessity   or, more accurately, 
perceived necessity. Lawyers write for a potentially hostile 
audience, in an adversarial atmosphere. Their documents 
are prone to scrutiny by loophole-seeking opponents. And 
so lawyers fear (wrongly, in my view) that change may lead 
to uncertainty, or simplicity to ambiguity. They fear that 
departing from traditional language and style may lead to 
defective drafting and the spectre of professional
Insecurity
The third factor is insecurity. The pace of modern legal 
practice reduces the time available to research new ways of 
expressing old ideas; and when time is short it seems safer 
to stick with the old than risk the new. Of course, to be 
completely blunt about it, this insecurity is born partly out 
of ignorance. Lawyers who are secure in their practice 
areas know that much of what they write can be recast in 
plainer language, without fear of a defective product.
THE PITFALLS OF CHANGE
There are, of course, some dangers in moving to modern,
' 7 O O 7
standard English. But most are more imagined than real. 
On closer examination, most carry no real threat to the 
validity of legal documents. Let me mention three: 
complexity, safety, and fear of what judges will think.
Complexity
It is said, rightly, that some legal concepts are inherently 
complex. From this it is argued that they are incapable of 
expression in plain language. Complex concepts require 
complex language, it is said. However, existing plain 
language statutes and documents give the lie to this 
argument.
The 'argument from inherent complexity', as it might 
be termed, was rebutted convincingly by the Law Reform 
Commission of Victoria. As part of its 1987 Report on 
Plain English and the Law, the Commission translated the 
Victorian Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Code into plain 
language. The translation was published as an Appendix 
to the Report. A more complex subject for legislation 
could hardly be imagined   unless it be income tax
legislation (incidentally, the same Commission also 
studied the comprehensibility of part of the Australian 
income tax legislation. The result: to understand the 
legislation (in its form at that time) required 12 years of 
schooling plus 15 years of university   27 years of 
education in all!). Similar plain language 'translations' 
have since been done in other areas of legislation, both 
here and in Australia, notably corporations law and 
taxation. In short, experience to date suggests that no area 
of law is too complex for plain language. Plain language 
may not be able to simplify concepts, but it can simplify 
the way concepts are expressed. Used properly, plain 
language clarifies complex concepts.
Safety
Another argument asserts that the traditional style of 
legal drafting is 'safe', while plain language is not (see the 
discussion in Kerr, 'Plain Language: Is it Legal?' (1991) 
New South Wales Law Society Journal 52; also Justice Hwang, 
'Plain English in Commercial Contracts' (1990) 32 
Malayan Law Review 296). This argument runs that many 
words and phrases have judicially-defined meanings, and 
that to substitute a modern word is to lose the benefit of 
that judicial definition. Meaning may have to be 
established afresh, perhaps by litigation.
However, this argument appears to have little empirical 
support. There is no evidence that 'plain language' 
statutes or documents give rise to more litigation than 
traditionally-worded documents. If anything, experience 
with standard-form legal documents suggests the reverse: 
that a well-drawn plain language document needs no 
judicial clarification. In contrast, court lists constantly 
feature cases seeking to divine meaning from traditionally- 
worded documents.
In any case, the proportion of judicially-defined words 
and phrases in any given statute or document is likely to 
be quite small. Research in the United States involving 
contracts for the sale of land shows that the proportion 
may be as low as three per cent (Barr, Hathaway, 
Omichinski and Pratt, 'Legalese and the Myth of Case 
Precedent' (1985) 64 Michigan Bar Journal 1136).
I do not mean to suggest that converting time-honoured 
legal phrases into plain language should be undertaken 
lightly. The translation process can lead to subtle changes 
in meaning. Further, the plain language version must 
capture the legal nuances of the original. For this, 
research may be necessary. To substitute a new phrase for 
an old, without appreciating the legal significance of the 
substitution, is as dangerous as using an old phrase 
without appreciating its significance. Indeed, to know 
when to substitute the new and when to retain the old  
when to leave well enough alone   is the most difficult 
aspect of drafting in plain language. Some genuine legal 
terms of art are difficult to translate into plain language. 
Sometimes they embody overtones of meaning that would
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take pages to explain; and sometimes it may even be more 
efficient to leave them in the document (but preferably 
adding a note for the reader, explaining their effect).
But none of these concerns, real as they are, justifies 
using jargon for its own sake. None justifies perpetuating 
linguistic eccentricities that serve only to enhance 
mystique, not legal effect. And yet we lawyers still 
introduce documents with 'whereas'. We 'execute' them 
rather than sign them. We 'demise' rather than lease. We 
'well and sufficiently repair' when 'repair' will do. We 
declare something 'null and void'   or even 'null and void
o
and of no further force or effect whatsoever'   when 'void' 
will do. We 'give devise and bequeath' when 'give' will do. 
We pass 'right, title and interest' when 'interest' will do. 
Not content with 'convey', we 'hereby convey'. We insist
on 'shall' to impose obligation when the rest of ther o
community uses 'must' (for an interesting discussion of 
'must' in the Australian Law Journal, see (f989) 63 ALJ 
75-78, 522-525, 726-728; (1990) 64 ALJ 168-169. For 
a more detailed study, see Kimble, 'The many misuses of 
Shall' (1992) 3 Scribes Journal of Legal Writing, 61-77.\ ' J O O 7
In Australia, there is no doubt that 'must' is quite 
sufficient to impose an obligation: South Australian Housing 
Trust v Development Assessment Commission (1994) 63 SASR 
35 at 38). None of these hallowed words and phrases is 
a true term of art. All can be simplified, and some can be 
discarded completely.
Judges and 'tradition'
It is also sometimes said that judges prefer the 
'traditional' style of legal drafting. A statute or document 
must be drafted to be litigation-proof; and (so the 
argument runs) since all litigation is decided by judges, 
and since judges prefer 'traditional' drafting, statutes and 
documents should be drafted in that way. This argument 
seems inherently weak; but in any case it is countered by 
evidence that judges in fact prefer documents to be in 
plain language. Surveys of American judges show that, 
given the choice, over 80 per cent would prefer to see 
pleadings in plain language rather than in traditional form 
(see Harrington and Kimble, 'Survey: Plain English Wins 
Every Which Way' (1987) 66 Michigan Bar Journal 1024; 
Kimble and Prokop, 'Strike Three for Legalese' (1990) 69 
Michigan Bar Journal 418; Child, 'Language Preferences of 
Judges and Lawyers: A Florida Survey' (1990) 64 Florida 
Bar Journal 32). Judges themselves have occasionally said as 
much extra-curially: for examples, see Mester, 'Plain 
English for Judges' (1983) 62 Michigan Bar Journal 978; 
Cohn, 'Effective Brief Writing: One Judge's Observations' 
(1983) 62 Michigan Bar Journal 987. As far as I know, no 
similar surveys have been done of English or Australian 
judges; but certainly in recent years some English and 
Australian judges have shown an increased willingness to 
condemn from the bench legal drafting that is convoluted 
and unclear. Epithets have included 'botched', 'half- 
baked', 'cobbled-together', 'doubtful', 'tortuous',
'archaic', 'incomprehensible legal gobbledegook', and 
'singularly inelegant' (these and other examples are 
discussed in Butt and Castle, Modern Legal Drafting, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, chapter 2.)
To be even-handed here, some Australian judges have 
recently been less than enthusiastic about plain language 
statutes. For example, Callaway J of the Victorian Court 
of Appeal scathingly described certain re-drafted 
provisions of the Corporations Law as reflecting 'the 
language of the pop songs' (GM St^AM Pearce and Co Pty Ltd 
v RGM Australia Pty Ltd (1998) 16 ACLC 429 at 432). 
Another, Meagher 1A of the New South Wales Court of7 o J
Appeal has dismissed plain language as an excuse for split 
infinitives and woolly thinking. But I suspect that even 
they would accept   albeit grudgingly   that modern 
Australian statutes, which are now increasingly being 
drafted in a plainer style, are far easier to read and apply 
than their traditionally-drafted forebears.
SOME BENEFITS OF PLAIN LANGUAGE
Having considered some of the pitfalls, let us now turn 
to some of the advantages that flow from using modern, 
standard English   'plain English'   in statutes and 
private legal documents. I want to suggest three: 
efficiency, reduced errors, and the image of the legal 
profession.
Efficiency
Plain language statutes and documents are more 
'efficient' than traditionally worded ones. They are easier 
to read, for both lawyers and non-lawyers, saving time for 
lawyers and non-lawyers. In a study for the Law Reform 
Commission of Victoria, lawyers read counterpart versions 
of the same statute, one written in plain language and the 
other in traditional language. The time taken to 
understand the plain language version was between one- 
third to one-half less than the time taken to understand 
the traditional version (the results are recorded in 
Eagleson, 'Plain English - A Boon for Lawyers' [1991] The 
Second Draft, Legal Writing Institute, p. 12.)
Also, because plain language documents are easier to 
read, queries about meaning are reduced. Many 
corporations and government agencies here and abroad 
claim to have saved substantial amounts by converting 
their standard-form documents to plain language. A 
recent survey in the United States by Professor Joseph 
Kimble records numerous examples of impressive savings 
that have followed the adoption of plain language 
documents Kimble, 'Writing for Dollars, Writing to 
Please' (1996-1997) 6 Scribes Journal of Legal Writing 1-38. 
For another study, see Mills and Duckworth, The Gains from 
Clarity, Centre for Microeconomic Policy Analysis and 
Centre for Plain Legal Language, University of Sydney, 
1996). 31
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Disclosing errors
Secondly, plain language helps expose errors. In 
contrast, legalese tends to hide inconsistencies and 
ambiguities, because errors are harder to find in dense, 
convoluted prose. Examples have been well documented 
(see Eagleson, 'Efficiency in Legal Drafting', in Essays onN o ' y o o ' J
Legislative Drafting in Honour of JQ Ewens, St Kelly ed., 
Adelaide University Press, 1990, pp 25-26). But for an 
easy illustration, look back at the excessively long lease and 
mortgage clauses cited near the beginning of this paper; 
notice how difficult it is to determine whether words or 
phrases have been dropped out, or legal concepts 
misphrased. Errors of this kind are more easily discerned 
when sentences are short and text is broken down into 
more digestible units.o
Image of the legal profession
Thirdly, plain language enhances the image of the legal 
profession, the obscurity of whose traditional language has 
long been a source of ridicule. And quite apart from its 
obscurity, legal writing is impersonal. It creates barriers of 
aloofness. It intimidates readers and keeps them in the 
dark. Surveys in the United States and Canada disclose 
that readers find legal language 'seriously 
incomprehensible' and find legal documents 'difficult/very 
difficult' to read (see Benson, 'The End of Legalese: The
x ' o
Game is Over' (1984-1985) 13 Review of Law & Social
Change 519, p. 532; Plain Language Institute of British 
Columbia, Preliminary Report, 'Critical Opinions: The 
Public's View of Legal Documents' (1992), p 18.) These 
surveys confirm a widely-held public perception that 
lawyers are indifferent about communicating clearly.
CONCLUSION
The benefits of plain legal language greatly outweigh any 
pitfalls that lie in the path of its adoption. Inevitably, in 
time, plain language will become the norm. The pressures 
will be too hard to resist. But it may be a long time 
coming. Traditional legal language will be a long time 
dying. But die it will, under the weight of the reality that 
it is imperfect and that modern, standard English is 
completely adequate for legal purposes. Wittgenstein 
once wrote of language, 'Everything that can be put into 
words can be put clearly'. Legal language is no 
different. ©
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